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Processing facilities handling large amounts of hazardous
substances are attractive targets for terrorists. Thus, these
work sites are exposed not only to accidents but also to inten-
tional threats. Some research has separately studied risk
caused by either potential accidental events or terrorist acts.
However, studies focusing on integrated risk assessment and
management (dealing with both safety and security issues)
are lacking. This paper proposes an approach to assess and
manage integrated risks. This method is based on an influ-
ence diagram which incorporates safety and security-related
factors into one framework. It considers the effects of man-
agement actions on both accidental and intentional risks.
This method can help to detect hidden risk (i.e., the risk not
recognized during design and operation stages) and ensure
to reduce the real risk to an acceptable level by guiding the
selection of management actions. The effectiveness of the pro-
posed method is demonstrated using the overfilling risk man-
agement of an oil tank. VC 2018 American Institute of Chemical
Engineers Process Saf Prog 000: 000–000, 2018
Keywords: decision making; safety and security; influence
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INTRODUCTION
Terrorism is increasingly threatening the world, and
attacks on process plants have repeatedly occurred in recent
years [1]. In June 2015, a terrorist attacked a U.S.-owned
chemical plant in France and caused an explosion in gas
canisters, leaving one person dead and two injured [2]. Three
weeks later, two explosions were caused by malicious acts at
a petrochemical plant in southern France [3]. In 2016, an
Algerian gas plant was hit by terrorists using rockets [4]. In
the same year, suicide car bombers attacked Libya’s main oil
terminals (Es Sider oil export terminal), and an oil storage
tank at Ras Lanuf was set on fire after a rocket hit [5]. In
2017, an attack was launched to blow up an Aramco fuel ter-
minal in southern Saudi Arabia using a speedboat laden with
explosives [6]. Process facilities are thus exposed to not only
accidental but intentional risks as well, which raises chal-
lenges to risk management. The accidental and intentional
risks are synergistic [7], influencing their causation and the
effects of risk prevention measures, and thus affecting the
decision making of risk management. In this paper, the term
measure is used to represent a management action to mini-
mize risk.
Some researchers have argued that it is not sufficient to
address accidental hazards; integrated risks including acci-
dental and intentional ones need to be studied to ascertain
the real risks confronted by the process industry [7–10]. Com-
pared to the work on separate assessment of either safety or
security related risks [11,12], relatively limited work has been
conducted using integrated risk assessment considering the
dependency of safety and security [7]. Fovino et al. [13]
incorporated intentional factors into traditional risk analysis
by integrating attack trees into a pre-existent fault tree (FT).
Their approach considered the dependency of intentional
acts and accidental failures to obtain the integrated risk.
Pietre-Cambacedes et al. [7] modeled the dependency of
safety and security of critical systems using Boolean logic
Driven Markov Processes. This model analyzed risk scenarios
in a qualitative and quantitative form, combining safety and
security aspects. As for integrated risk management, to the
authors’ knowledge, no specific decision model exists for
integrated risks considering both safety and security aspects.
Previous works have studied the decision making for acci-
dental risk. Yuan et al. [14] proposed a Bayesian network
(BN)-based method to help allocate safety measures for dust
explosions considering both available budget and acceptable
residual risk. Sedki et al. [15] proposed an influence diagram
(ID)-based approach to study the consequences of deviant
actions of operators based on three parameters: benefit, cost,
and deficit. This model enables managers to rank a set of
actions through the utility calculation of each action pertain-
ing to the criteria. However, these works only consider acci-
dental risks, ignoring intentional ones. Thus, their selected
management actions to minimize risk cannot solve the prob-
lem of hidden risks, which will be discussed in this paper.
The hidden risk refers to that which managers do not recog-
nize while conducting risk management. Aside from the
works about safety-oriented concerns, some research has
analyzed the measure decision for security issues. Villa et al.
[16] proposed a method to conduct cost-benefit and cost-
effectiveness analysis for the allocation of physical security
measures. The approach helps to select economically feasi-
ble security measures with a maximum net present value
considering the budget constraints of a chemical plant.VC 2018 American Institute of Chemical Engineers
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Stewart et al. [17] described risk-informed decision support
for assessing the costs and benefits of counterterrorism pro-
tective measures for infrastructure. This research showed
under what combination of risk reduction, threat probability,
and fatality and damage costs, the counterterrorism protec-
tive measures would be cost-effective for infrastructures
through three illustrative examples. However, these studies
did not consider the influence of interaction of safety and
security on risk reduction effects of measures. Thus, the effi-
ciency of measures may be underestimated, negatively
influencing the decision making for minimizing risk.
This paper proposes a risk-based measure decision
method for integrated risk management. It discusses the pro-
cess and principles of measure decision and clarifies the
influence of the interaction of safety and security on decision
making. This method includes the dependency of safety and
security-related factors and visually shows how measures
work to reduce integrated risks. By managing risks from an
integrated perspective, the method avoids the underestima-
tion of measures’ effects. Furthermore, this method can
detect the hidden risk to ensure that the real risk confronted
by facilities is reduced to an acceptable level. The new point
is that the proposed risk-based method can effectively man-
age integrated risks considering the dependency of safety
and security.
This paper is organized as follows: background section
presents the background of integrated risk, an influence dia-
gram and the effects of measures. Method description section
explains the risk-based decision-making method. A case
study of overfilling of a gasoline tank is demonstrated in
illustrative example section. Conclusions and future work
section provides discussion and conclusions.
BACKGROUND
Integrated Risk
To facilitate the study of integrated risk, both safety-
related events (i.e., accidents, incidents, mishaps, and near
misses) and security-related events (i.e., terrorism, vandalism,
and mischief) are called abnormal events. Safety-related
events are called accidental abnormal events, while security-
related events are called intentional abnormal events. The
risk is defined as probability multiplied by consequences
(losses) [8,18]. Following this definition, the integrated risk is
the product of probability and consequence of an abnormal
event. Integrated risk constitutes an accidental risk and inten-
tional risk (see Figure 1). The basic difference between acci-
dental and intentional risks is whether it includes harmful
human intentions [19]. The accidental risk is caused by ran-
dom failure (accidental abnormal events), while the
intentional risk includes intentional acts (intentional abnor-
mal events).
Oil fire is taken as an example to explain integrated risk.
As shown in Figure 1, oil fire can occur in an accidental sce-
nario where oil leaks due to corrosion and the leaked oil are
accidentally ignited by the spark of electronic equipment; it
can also occur in an intentional scenario where attackers
destroy the tank to expose oil and ignite it using a lighter.
The accidental scenario and intentional scenario can both
lead to an oil fire. The product of probability and conse-
quence of oil fire in both accidental and intentional scenarios
is the integrated risk of an oil fire. Managing oil fire risk
through an integrated perspective is necessary because acci-
dental and intentional oil fires are dependent as shown in
Figure 1, and thus a risk measure may have effects on both
an accidental and intentional oil fire. For example, an effec-
tive fire suppression system can mitigate not only an acci-
dental oil fire but also an intentional oil fire. The goal of this
study is to demonstrate the advantage of integrated risk man-
agement considering the synergy of accidental and inten-
tional abnormal events. To clearly demonstrate the function
of the proposed method, some simplifications are made. The
consequences (i.e., damage of abnormal events to facilities)
are considered as fixed, and probabilities of abnormal events
are considered as the only variable reflecting integrated risks.
Thus, this study focuses on discussion about the manage-
ment of occurrence probabilities of abnormal events.
Influence Diagram
An ID is a probabilistic graphical model used to help
decide risk management measures under uncertainty, consid-
ering the utility (e.g., efficiency and cost) of measures. Com-
pared to a risk assessment model like BN, besides chance
nodes, ID (see Figure 2) contains two extra types of nodes—
decision nodes and utility nodes [15]. Decision nodes repre-
sent the decision to apply or not to apply certain measures,
while utility nodes represent the utility of decision alterna-
tives or strategies. By analyzing the utility values of different
decision alternatives, the measures reducing risks to an
acceptable level are selected. Also, since the budget is lim-
ited in practice, the selected measures need to satisfy budget
requirements, which can be analyzed by comparing utility
values to the budget. The chance nodes, decision nodes, and
utility nodes are linked using arcs. The arcs among chance
nodes of an ID have the same properties as the arcs in a BN,
Figure 1. Integrated oil fire risk. [Color figure can be viewed
at wileyonlinelibrary.com] Figure 2. A general influence diagram.
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representing that the linked chance nodes are dependent
[20]. The arcs from decision nodes to chance nodes mean
the decision of measures to be taken can change the occur-
rence probabilities of the linked chance variables. For exam-
ple, safety training may reduce the occurrence probabilities
of human error; thus, the decision node “safety training”
needs to be linked to the chance node “human error.” Their
quantitative relationship is represented using a conditional
probability table (CPT) in which the decision to “not provide
safety training” corresponds to a high occurrence probability
of human error (e.g., 0.45), while the decision to “provide
safety training” corresponds to a smaller occurrence proba-
bility such as 0.1 [21,22]. In this way, the ID establishes a
link between a decision and the causal factor. When the
measure “provides safety training” is analyzed by a manager,
the state of the decision node is set as “provide safety train-
ing.” Then the ID is updated, and it obtains the updated risks
after application of the measure. The arcs from chance nodes
and decision nodes to utility nodes demonstrate that the util-
ity values are influenced by the state combination of chance
nodes and decision nodes. Their relationships are repre-
sented by conditional tables which show the utility values
corresponding to different state combinations of chance
nodes and decision nodes. When different measures are
applied, the ID is updated to obtain new utility values based
on which the measures are assessed and the decision is
made. The dashed arcs among decision nodes represent the
decision sequence of different measures [15,23]. The shapes
of chance, decision and utility nodes in an ID are different.
Chance nodes are oval, while decision nodes are rectangular
[24]. The utility nodes are hexagons [15]. The values of
chance nodes are probabilities, ranging from 0 to 1, while
those of utility nodes do not have the range limitation. The
decision nodes represent the proposed measures; thus, they
only have two states, “application of the measure” or “no
application of the measure” without numerical values. The
ID including decision and utility nodes is an excellent tool
for decision making. It can represent the dependency of
safety and security-related factors and facilitate measure
selection considering measures’ effects on accidental and
intentional risks.
Effects of Measures on Accidental
and Intentional Risks
Safety and security are dependent, as shown in Figure 3;
thus, the safety measures may influence security, while secu-
rity measures influence safety. For example, the safety mea-
sure of a high-level alarm can also inform the high level
caused by intentional acts, and thus prevent the intentional
damage. Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) can protect
workers from abnormal events (e.g., toxic gas release)
caused by both accidental and intentional causes. The secu-
rity measure of unauthorized access control can not only
prevent attackers but also reduce human-induced uninten-
tional events (human error), since it can avoid accidents by
preventing unauthorized or untrained personnel from enter-
ing specific workplaces. However, some measures may have
conflicting effects on safety and security. The security mea-
sure “non-explosion-proof security surveillance facilities”
may cause an accidental explosion of released flammable
substances. The safety measure “warning signs for accidents”
may provide attack thoughts for terrorists. Since measures
have effects on both safety and security, the decision needs
to be made from an integrated perspective. Figure 3 also
demonstrates that integrated risk change reflects the effi-
ciency of measures which serves as one of the criteria for
measure assessment.
A real accident is analyzed to explain how risk manage-
ment measures can influence safety and security. According
to a CSB report [25], a toxic chemical release occurred during
an unloading operation at the MGPI Processing, Inc. in Atch-
ison, the United States in 2016. The driver of the cargo tank
motor vehicle (CTMV) incorrectly connected the discharge
hose of sulfuric acid to the unsecured fill line for the sodium
hypochlorite bulk tank. This led to the inadvertent mixing of
sulfuric acid and sodium hypochlorite, which caused a reac-
tion in the sodium hypochlorite bulk tank. This reaction pro-
moted the release of a cloud containing toxic chlorine gas
and other compounds. Because of this gas release, over 140
individuals sought medical attention and six of them were
hospitalized. In this toxic gas release, some measures influ-
enced safety and security-related risks. The padlock on the
cam lever dust cap that secures the fill line is designed to
prevent unauthorized access. It can not only prevent human
error (incorrect connection) as occurred in the MGPI acci-
dent, but can also prevent the damage caused by intentional
acts. Thus, the measure “install padlock on the cam lever
dust cap” can reduce both accidental and intentional risks.
Another measure has opposite effects on accidental risk and
intentional risk. To protect the respirators from theft and
intentional damage, operators have a practice of locking res-
pirators between shelves. Thus, in an emergency condition,
operators would be unable to access their respirators,
thereby worsening the severity of the injuries and becoming
a source of potential fatality. The measure “locking respira-
tors” benefits security to some degree, but it increases the
safety-related risk. The accident occurred because the driver
mistook the sulfuric acid’s fill line for the sodium hypochlor-
ite’s. If the measure “add markers of the chemical at fill line
connections” is applied, this error can be avoided. However,
such markers may provide information for attackers to cause
damage. Thus, the measure “add markers of the chemical at
fill line connections” can reduce the accidental risk, but may
increase the intentional risk. Another measure, “install addi-
tional monitoring and emergency shutdown devices,” as
applied by MGPI after the accident, can detect a release
caused by either accidental or intentional events and shut
down the operation to minimize the damage. Thus, this mea-
sure can reduce the accidental and intentional risks at the
same time. Through the analysis of the MGPI toxic gas
release incident, it is evident that a measure can simulta-
neously influence safety and security-related risks. Thus, a
measure decision of risk management needs to consider the
measure’s effects on accidental and intentional risks. The
effects of measures on integrated risk can be treated as a cri-
terion for measure assessment and decision making.
Figure 3. The effects of measures on accidental and inten-
tional risks. [Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlineli-
brary.com]
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METHOD DESCRIPTION
Methodology Framework
This ID-based risk management method is divided into two
stages. As mentioned in integrated risk section, the consequences
(i.e., damage of abnormal events to facilities) are considered as
fixed, and then the integrated probability of abnormal events
reflects integrated risk. Thus, this study focuses on discussion
about the management of probabilities of abnormal events. The
first stage is integrated probability assessment, while the second is
measure decision. In the first stage, a BN was established for the
assessment of an integrated probability of an abnormal event. If
the probability is unacceptable, potential measures are proposed
and an ID is established in stage two based on the BN of stage
one. The rationality analysis of proposed measures is conducted
first. Rationality of measures is explained in criteria of measure
assessment section. Then the effects and costs of reasonable mea-
sures are assessed using the ID, based on which the decision is
made. The methodology framework is shown in Figure 4.
Approach for Risk-based Measure Decision
Criteria of Measure Assessment
Three criteria are applied for measure decisions: rational-
ity, risk reduction efficiency and cost.
1. Rationality: Rationality of measures means that measures
do not influence the normal operation of the process plant.
For example, attackers may release oil through valves. If all
valves are removed, it causes problems for the oil release
by attackers, but the function of valves necessary for nor-
mal production is missing. Thus, this measure is not ratio-
nal. To conserve assessment resources, such measures are
discarded in the screening step of decision making.
2. Risk reduction efficiency: The goal of measures is to reduce
risks. Thus, the selected measures (strategies) need to
reduce risk to an acceptable range effectively.
3. Cost: Risk can be reduced with the increase of investment
for risk management. In an extreme case, the process plant
is protected by the security measures used to protect the
military base and the security risk may be reduced to
close to 0. However, those measures are too expensive to
apply. Practically, risk management has the limitation of
budget, and the cost of measures cannot exceed the
budget allocation. The cost of measures should be a crite-
rion of measure selection. Thus, when several measures
(strategies) can reduce risks to an acceptable range, the
economic ones are preferred.
Risk Assessment
BN is applied to assess the integrated probability of the
abnormal event considering the dependency of safety and
security, as shown in Figure 5a. First, an abnormal event
(e.g., gas release or explosions) is defined, and then the acci-
dental and intentional causal factors are identified. These
causal factors and the abnormal event are represented using
chance nodes in BN. According to the dependency among
causal factors and abnormal events, these nodes are linked
by arcs, and their quantitative relationship is represented
using CPTs [20]. In this way, the dependency between safety
and security is included (see the green arcs in Figure 5a),
and the integrated probability of the abnormal event is
obtained. If the calculated probability is higher than the
accepted standard, risk management measures are requested.
Decision Making
1. Measure proposal
Experts propose potential measures for integrated risk
reduction based on the causal factors. The measures can
be inherent, engineered, or procedural [14].
2. Measure assessment
Decision nodes and utility nodes are added to the BN to
obtain an ID (see Figure 5b). The decision nodes repre-
senting measures are linked to related chance nodes. Their
effects on the linked chance nodes are represented using
CPTs. Besides adding cost as a utility node, the node
“abnormal event” changes from a chance node to a utility
node, since the probability change of the abnormal event
is a parameter for effect assessment of the measure. Thus,
there are two utility nodes in the ID. To assess the cost of
these measures, these decision nodes are also linked to
the utility (cost) node. After establishing the ID, measures
are assessed in two steps based on the criteria.
Screening step: Proposed measures are analyzed to see
whether they influence normal operations. If a measure
influences normal operations, it is not rational and needs to
be discarded. The screening process makes the analysis of
the next step clearer.
Engineering-economic step: This step includes the effi-
ciency and cost assessment of measures. The decision nodes
are set as “application” or “no application”; then the updated
integrated probability of the abnormal event and costs of
measures is obtained. The updated probability of the abnor-
mal event and cost of measures is compared to the accepted
Figure 4. Methodology framework.
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standard and budget to select management measures. If sev-
eral measures (strategies) satisfy the requirement of risk
reduction, the economical one is selected. The cost cannot
exceed the budget designation.
This method uses a graphical model to clearly show how
the measures reduce the integrated risks in a visual form. For
example, the red arcs in Figure 5b represent how measure 2
reduces the integrated risk. Measure 2 works on the acciden-
tal causal factor 3 which contributes accidental and inten-
tional abnormal events; thus, measure 2 can influence the
occurrence probabilities of both accidental and intentional
abnormal events. This visual form can assist experts to pro-
pose further measures, which are explained in illustrative
example section. Furthermore, using CPTs, this model has a
flexible form to represent the relationship between measures
and causal factors. The relationships between measures and
factors have two types. The first is that the measure elimi-
nates causal factors [26], while the second improves the state
of factors. For example, if the avoiding safety measure 2 [26]
in Figure 5b eliminates the safety-related causal factor 3. The
proposed model uses a CPT (see Table 1) to represent this
relationship without a structural change of the model. Table
2 shows another relationship: the application of measure 1
reduces the occurrence probability of accidental causal factor
1 to a smaller value (0.05) instead of eliminating this causal
factor.
ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE
Overfilling of storage tanks is a potential hazard for off-
loading operations of gasoline. It can lead to fire and explo-
sions, causing severe damage to the community and
environment [27,28]. Thus, controlling the occurrence of
overfilling to an acceptable level is very important for the
safe offloading operation in an oil storage depot. An illustra-
tive example of overfilling a gasoline storage tank is ana-
lyzed to demonstrate the function of the proposed method.
This case study is analyzed based on a practical overflow
accident which occurred at the Caribbean Petroleum Corpo-
ration facility [27]. In 2009, an overflow occurred in San Juan
Bay when the Cape Bruny cargo ship was unloading more
than 11.5 million gallons of gasoline to various tanks on site.
Tank 409 started to overflow between the 11 p.m. and 12
a.m. check on October 22. The released gasoline formed a
vapour and exploded, burning 17 of the 48 tanks. The CSB
report [27] revealed the following causes for the overfilling.
The level measure gauge and transmitter did not work; thus,
operators could not obtain accurate tank levels. In this situa-
tion, operators incorrectly estimated the tank fill time due to
lacking the ability to identify and incorporate the flow rate
change in real time into tank fill time calculations. No inde-
pendent alarm existed to inform operators about the high
level of gasoline. Therefore, the operators failed to shut
down or divert the flow before overfilling. After failing to
shut down the flow manually, no automatic overfilling pre-
vention system existed to prevent potential overfilling, ren-
dering the occurrence of overfilling.
Overfilling Probability Assessment
As described in method description section, BN is applied
to assess the occurrence probability of gasoline overfilling.
This model not only considers the accidental factors identi-
fied based on the practical case [27], but also includes the
security factors. For the intentional perspective, this case
study considers a specific attack scenario where an outsider
creeps into a storage farm without firearms and attempts to
cause an overflow. To achieve this goal, attackers need to
launch attacks, enter the storage farm, and successfully cause
the overflow. Thus, lax entrance control and lax security
inside the farm contribute to the intentionally caused overfill-
ing. The identified root causal factors and their prior proba-
bilities are shown in Table 3. These prior probabilities are
decided through an informed estimation based on the avail-
able literature [29,30]. The storage farm has a much weaker
Figure 5. The establishment of ID based on BN. (a) BN for risk assessment (b) ID for risk management. [Color figure can be
viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
Table 1. CPT for accidental causal factor 3.
Measure 2 Application No Application
Poor state of accidental causal factor 3 0 0.10
Good state of accidental causal factor 3 1 0.90
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security level than chemical plants; thus, its probabilities of
lax entrance control and lax security inside the farm are con-
sidered to be high. According to [27], since the plant does
not have an independent high-level alarm and automatic
overfilling prevention system, the prior probabilities of these
two factors are 1.
After identifying causal factors and analyzing their rela-
tionships, the BN is established and shown in Figure 6. This
model includes the dependency of safety and security-
related factors (see the blue, green, and orange arcs). Specifi-
cally, when attackers attempt to cause overfilling, the auto-
matic overfilling prevention system prevents their success by
diverting the flow to another tank. Furthermore, when the
level reaches a critical value, the independent high-level
alarm can inform operators about the danger of overfilling.
By this, the operators may detect the intentional acts and
prevent the intentionally caused overfilling. Moreover, when
attackers operate the valves to divert the flow to full tanks,
the attackers’ acts may be detected in time by operators in
the control room by monitoring the abnormal level change.
Thus, the three accidental factors, “failure of the automatic
overfilling prevention system,” “failure of the independent
high-level alarm” and “not obtaining gasoline level” contrib-
ute not only to accidental overfilling but also to overfilling
caused by attackers. By linking the three accidental causal
factors to the security node “successfully cause overfilling”
the dependency between safety and security is established in
the model.
The occurrence probability of gasoline overfilling is calcu-
lated using the BN of Figure 6. As shown in row 2 and col-
umn 4 of Table 5, the occurrence probability of gasoline
overflow is 1.48 E 22. In this case, the accepted standard for
gasoline overflow is considered as 1.00 E 23. Then, it is
observed that the occurrence probability of overfilling is
unacceptable; thus, measures are needed to manage the risk
of overflow.
Risk Management
Potential measures are proposed to reduce the overflow
probability.
1. Removing all valves
Attackers can operate valves to divert flow to full tanks,
thereby causing overfilling. Thus, when removing all
valves, a hazardous factor for intentional overfilling is
eliminated.
2. Education for level estimation
When the level measure gauge fails, workers need to
estimate the gasoline level and calculate filling time. If
the estimation is correct, the flow can be manually
diverted before a tank is full. Therefore, educating opera-
tors to estimate levels correctly can help to avoid acciden-
tal overfilling.
3. Installation of an independent high-level alarm
The independent high-level alarm can inform operators
to stop or divert flow to avoid overfilling when a level
reaches the critical value, even if the primary system of
level measure fails.
Table 2. CPT for accidental causal factor 1.
Measure 1 Application
No
Application
Poor state of accidental causal factor 1 0.05 0.10
Good state of accidental causal factor 1 0.95 0.90
Table 3. Root causal factors and prior probabilities [29, 30].
Root Causal Factors Prior Probabilities
Malfunction of the level measure gauge 1.05 E21
Failure of the transmitter 2.43 E22
Incorrect estimation of the level 1.10 E21
Failure of the independent high-level alarm 1.00
Failure of the automatic overfilling
prevention system
1.00
Attack 1.00 E21
Lax entrance control 3.00 E21
Lax security inside the farm 2.50 E21
Figure 6. The BN for gasoline overflow assessment. [Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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4. Installation of an automatic overfilling prevention system
The automatic overfilling prevention system can auto-
matically stop or divert the flow to another tank when
the level is beyond the critical value to avoid overfilling.
5. Inspection and maintenance of level measure gauge
The level measure gauge provides required level infor-
mation for operators to divert the flow in time. As a pro-
cedural measure, “inspection and maintenance of level
measure gauge” improves the operation of the level mea-
sure gauge, which helps to reduce the overfilling
probability.
These measures are assessed based on the criteria (ratio-
nality, risk reduction efficiency, and cost) explained in
method description section. First, the rationality of measures
is analyzed. For the measure “removing all valves,” if all
valves are removed, operators cannot control the flow, nega-
tively influencing the offloading operation. Thus, this mea-
sure is not rational in this case study, and it needs to be
discarded. The remaining measures (education for level esti-
mation, installation of an independent high-level alarm,
installation of an automatic overfilling prevention system,
and inspection and maintenance of level measure gauge) do
not influence the required operations; thus, they are rational.
The effects and cost of these reasonable measures are further
analyzed to select the proper measures. After linking these
reasonable measures with corresponding causal factors in
Figure 6, the ID is obtained, as shown in Figure 7. It is worth
noting that the chance node “gasoline overflow” of BN is
converted to a utility node in the ID since the probability of
gasoline overflow serves as an index for measure assess-
ment. Besides the utility node “gasoline overflow,” another
utility node “cost” is added in the ID. Then CPTs of causal
nodes influenced by measures are decided according to the
related literature [29] and experts’ opinion. Taking the CPT of
failure of an independent high-level alarm as an example, its
CPT is shown in Table 4. It shows that when the measure
installation of an independent high-level alarm is applied,
the probability of failure of the independent high-level alarm
is reduced from 1 to 0.043 [29].
The obtained ID in Figure 7 visually shows the risk reduc-
tion process with the proposed measures. For example, the
measure “education for level estimation” reduces the inte-
grated overfilling risk by reducing the incorrect estimation of
the level. This visual diagram helps to detect which causal
factors still do not have measures, thereby providing help for
further measure proposal. For instance, the causal factor
“failure of the transmitter” does not have a reduction mea-
sure. It reminds experts whether measures are available to
reduce the failure of the transmitter when additional mea-
sures are needed. Furthermore, when numerous factors and
measures are involved in a complicated problem, it is diffi-
cult for managers to select proper strategies which include
multi-measures. This model can conveniently calculate the
cost and effects of strategies on accidental and intentional
risks. Thus, this model facilitates strategy selection for com-
plicated problems.
The management measures need to reduce the probability
of overfilling to an acceptable level. Furthermore, the cost
of selected measures needs to be smaller than the bud-
get allocation. Thus, the measures (strategies) should first sat-
isfy the requirement of a probability reduction of overfilling.
Then, among all the satisfied measures (strategies) for proba-
bility reduction, the economical ones are selected to manage
overfilling risk. Assume that the budget for risk management
is $10,000. To analyze efficiency and cost of measures, each
of the four measures is set as “application” by turn, while the
other three measures are set as “no application.” The cost of
each measure and corresponding probabilities of overfilling,
intentional overfilling, and accidental overfilling are obtained
and shown in Table 5.
The overfilling probabilities after using corresponding
measures are displayed in rows 3–6 and column 4 of Table
5, while the overfilling probability without applying mea-
sures is shown in row 2 and column 4 of Table 5. Compar-
ing the overfilling probabilities before and after applying
corresponding measures, it shows that all measures can sig-
nificantly reduce the probability of overfilling. However, the
measure “education for level estimation” only reduces the
probability of accidental overfilling (see row 3 and columns
2, 3 of Table 5), while the other three measures reduce both
accidental and intentional overfilling probabilities (see rows
4–6 and columns 2, 3 of Table 5). If the security risk is not
included in this analysis, the effects of those three measures
are underestimated. For example, after applying the indepen-
dent high-level alarm, the overfilling probability reduces
from 1.48 E 22 to 2.41 E 23. If the security risk is not con-
sidered, the effect of the measure “installation of the inde-
pendent high-level alarm” is underestimated by 1.35 E 23.
The error value is even more substantial than the acceptance
criteria (1.00 E 23). Thus, the error cannot be ignored. Since
Table 5. The effect and cost of each measure.
Measures
Intentional
Overfilling
Probability
Accidental
Overfilling
Probability
Overfilling
Probability
Cost of
Measures
No 2.35 E23 1.25 E22 1.48 E22 0
Education for level estimation 2.35 E23 2.70 E23 5.03 E23 $500
Inspection and maintenance of level measure gauge 1.67 E23 1.24 E23 2.91 E23 $1,000
Installation of an independent high-level alarm 1.00 E23 1.41 E23 2.41 E23 $2,000
Installation of an automatic overfilling prevention
system
1.43 E24 7.59 E24 8.96 E24 $20,000
Table 4. The CPT for the failure of the independent high-
level alarm [29].
Installation of an
Independent
high-level alarm Application No Application
Failure of an independent
high-level alarm
0.043 1
Success of an independent
high-level alarm
0.957 0
Process Safety Progress (Vol.00, No.00) Published on behalf of the AIChE DOI 10.1002/prs Month 2018 748 March 2019 Published on behalf of the AIChE DOI 10.1002/prs Process Safety Progress (Vol.38, No.1)
risk reduction efficiency is an essential criterion for measure
selection, if the effects of measures are underestimated, it
may negatively influence the decision of risk reduction mea-
sures. This proposed model avoids such underestimation and
thus helps to select appropriate measures based on their
actual effects.
According to the overfilling probabilities in rows 3–6 and
column 4 of Table 5, only the measure “installation of an
automatic overfilling prevention system” reduces the proba-
bility of overflow to an acceptable level. However, its cost
exceeds the budget allowance. This means that no single
measure can satisfy the requirements of risk reduction effi-
ciency and cost control. Thus, the strategy which includes
two measures is analyzed. Since the measure “installation of
an automatic overfilling prevention system” cannot satisfy the
budget requirement, only three measures are left to form
strategies. Three strategies are obtained by combining two of
the three measures. These strategies are set as applications
by turn in the ID, and the effects and costs of the three strat-
egies are shown in Table 6.
As Table 6 demonstrates, the probability of overfilling
(9.79 E 24) reduces to an acceptable level, and the cost
($3,000) is kept within the budget requirement only after the
application of strategy 3. Thus, strategy 3 is selected to pro-
tect the storage tank from overfilling. To avoid overfilling,
measures “inspection and maintenance of level measure
gauge’ and ‘installation of an independent high-level alarm”
are applied in the tank farm.
Discussion
Rows 2–4 and column 6 of Table 6 show the cost
increases from strategy 1 to strategy 3. According to an inter-
view with a safety manager of Yancon Cathay Coal
Chemicals CO., LTD in China, the plant prefers typically con-
servative measures for safety management. For some poten-
tial hazards, they only take simple measures such as
“recording the abnormal event to remind workers to be
cautious”. Comparing the effects of strategies 1 and 3 in
rows 2 and 4 and column 5 reveals that if only pursuing less
cost, the strategy (measure) may not achieve the expected
goal of risk reduction. The facility may still be exposed to
unacceptable risk with the applied measures. Thus, the effect
assessment of measures is essential. This was demonstrated
by a rupture of the heat exchanger at Tesoro Anacortes
Refinery of Washington that occurred in 2010 [31]. The heat
exchanger catastrophically ruptured due to a High Tempera-
ture Hydrogen Attack (HTHA), and the highly flammable
hydrogen and naphtha were released and ignited. This
caused an explosion and an intense fire, burning for more
than 3 h. The rupture fatally injured seven employees, and it
became the largest fatal incident at a U.S. petroleum refinery
since the BP Texas City accident in March 2005 [31]. Accord-
ing to the CSB investigation [31], mechanical integrity pro-
grams at the Tesoro Anacortes refinery emphasized
inspection strategies to control the HTHA mechanism that
ultimately caused the major process incident. However,
inspection for HTHA is tough because the damage can be
microscopic and may exist only in small localized areas of
equipment. Furthermore, to identify HTHA by inspection,
equipment must already be damaged by HTHA [31]. Thus,
the inspection was unreliable and failed to prevent the rup-
ture. The Tesoro Anacortes refinery simply cited nonspecific,
judgment-based qualitative measures to reduce the risk of
HTHA mechanisms without rigorous analyses of their effects
[31]. This practical event reveals the importance of assessing
the effects of measures before making the decision instead
Figure 7. The ID for overfilling of a storage tank. [Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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of focusing on the measures’ cost. The proposed method
provides a tool for managers to assess the effects of potential
measures (strategies).
The results in Table 5 can guide strategy selection since
they show the specific probabilities of either accidental
overfilling or intentional overfilling. For example, among
all the financially acceptable measures, the installation of
an independent high-level alarm has the best effect of risk
reduction. However, after its application, the intentional
overflow probability is 1.00 E 23, which is not smaller
than the accepted standard. This means if a measure is
selected to form a strategy with the installation of an inde-
pendent high-level alarm, the measure must enable the
reduction of intentional overfilling. Thus, the safety mea-
sures which only work for accidental overfilling are not
considered. This guides measure selection to form an effec-
tive strategy. This point is confirmed by the application
results of the strategies in rows 3 and 4 and columns 3–5
of Table 6.
If intentional overfilling is ignored while conducting risk
analysis and only accidental risk is considered as in previous
research [14,15], the accidental overfilling probability is seen
as the overfilling probability. According to row 3, column 4
and row 4, column 4 of Table 6, strategies 2 and 3 can
reduce the overfilling probability (i.e., accidental overfilling
probability) to 4.29 E 24 and 2.68 E 24, respectively. These
overfilling probabilities are acceptable compared to the
acceptance standard (1.00 E 23). Thus, both strategies 2 and
3 can satisfy the risk reduction requirement. Since the cost of
strategy 2 is smaller than that of strategy 3, the conclusion
would be to select strategy 2. However, this decision leaves
the storage tank with an unacceptable risk, since the hidden
risk (security risk) after applying strategy 2 is ignored. This
proposed model can detect the hidden risk and help conduct
effective risk management.
This model clearly shows the component change in the
overfilling risk after the application of different strategies.
According to rows 2–4 and columns 3–4 of Table 6 and
row 2 and columns 2–3 of Table 5, after the application of
safety strategies, the accidental overfilling probability has
more significant reduction than that of intentional overfill-
ing. Consequently, although in the original state, accidental
overfilling is the significant hazard with an occurrence
probability 1.25 E 22, after application of each of the three
safety strategies, the probability of intentional overfilling
becomes higher than that of accidental overfilling. This
means that intentional acts become the major contributor to
the occurrence of overfilling. For example, when strategy 2
is applied, the probability of intentional overfilling is 1.00
E 23, while its accidental counterpart reduces to 4.29
E 24. These results provide an opportunity for managers to
learn significant risk sources.
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
This study proposed a risk-based decision-making method
for integrated risk management of hazardous processing
facilities. This ID-based method incorporated security risk
into the risk management system. It considered the depen-
dency of safety and security-related factors and demonstrated
how measures reduce accidental and intentional risks. Poten-
tial measures (strategies) were assessed using the proposed
method according to three criteria. A case study of the over-
filling of storage tanks was analyzed to demonstrate the util-
ity and effectiveness of the proposed method. The key
highlights of the proposed method are:
1. Visually representing the dependency between safety and
security, and showing the relationship between measures
and causal factors.
2. Flexibly representing the effects of measures on causal
factors. Thus, the model structure does not need to
change when avoiding measures are applied.
3. Avoiding underestimation of the efficiency of measures.
This provides the real measure effect which is essential
for decision making.
4. Detecting the hidden risk, thereby ensuring that the
selected measures (strategies) reduce the real risk to an
acceptable range.
5. Enabling obtaining the accidental and intentional risks
before and after the application of different measures
(strategies). Not only can this inform the managers about
the significant risk source, but it can also guide the selec-
tion of measures to form an effective strategy.
In future work, more interactive relationships of safety
and security can be analyzed using complex engineering
cases. Specifically, an engineering case can include measures
with opposite effects on safety and security. Furthermore, in
the complex and highly digitized modern plant, cybersecu-
rity and physical security are also highly dependent. For
example, by breaking cybersecurity, hackers can cause fire
and explosion (physical events) [32]. In future work, cyber
security can also be included in the integrated risk
management.
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